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A bipartisan consensus about the means and ends of American foreign 
policy is generally thought to have been part of the American political 
environment during the Cold War era. This consensus is also 
commonly thought to have been a casualty of the Vietnam War, when 
disagreements arose about the threat of communism, the use of 
American troops abroad, and relations with the Soviet Union. This 
article uses public opinion data from the decades following World 
War II pertaining to these areas of assumed change to measure 
whether a consensus ever existed and whether it eroded in the wake of 
Vietnam. The authors conclude that evidence of change can be found 
but that it is less dramatic in some respects than might be expected. 
Eugene R. Wittkop/ is Professor of Political Science at Louisiana 
State University. He is author of Faces of Internationalism: Public 
Opinion and American Foreign Policy and coauthor of American 
Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process. 
James M. McCormick is Professor of Political Science at Iowa State 
University. He is author of American Foreign Policy and American 
Values. 
Building domestic support for their foreign policy initiatives has been a 
primary concern of American policymakers throughout the post-World 
*The Chicago Council public opinion data were made available by the Inter-University 
Consortium for Political Research. Most of the remaining data came from Robert Y. 
Shapiro of Columbia University and the Harris archives of the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill. The paper is an abbreviated version of a chapter in Wittkopf's 
Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, recently pub-
lished by Duke University Press. 
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628 The Cold War Consensus 
War II era. President Harry Truman found it prudent to "scare the hell 
out of the American people" to build popular support for the emerging 
design of postwar American foreign policy, whereas President Dwight 
Eisenhower and his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, adopted a 
strategy that emphasized bipartisan support in Congress. The idea of a 
"bipartisan foreign policy consensus" came eventually to describe the 
domestic context of American foreign policy during the Cold War years: 
the United States would cooperate with others to solve global as well as 
national problems, but if need be would also intervene in the affairs of 
others, using force when necessary to protect its self-defined interests. 
The arrows and olive branch in the talons of the eagle in the great seal of 
the United States symbolize this dual approach. 
The Vietnam War, however, shattered the Cold War consensus, yet it 
continued to charm policymakers. President Richard Nixon and Vice 
President Spiro Agnew appealed to the "silent majority" to support the 
Nixon Administration's Vietnam policies against a perceived vocal 
minority; President Ronald Reagan castigated members of Congress for 
deserting what he felt had been the bipartisan support of the administra-
tion's Middle Eastern and Central American policies; and President 
George Bush called in his inaugural address for a restoration of the "old 
bipartisanship" missing since the divisiveness caused by Vietnam. 
In the wake of Vietnam, conflict and cooperation abroad came to 
divide rather than unite Americans, as is evident on three core issues: (1) 
the threat of communism, (2) the use of American troops abroad, and (3) 
relations with the Soviet Union. 1 If a foreign policy consensus existed 
prior to Vietnam, it seems reasonable to expect a majority of the 
American people would have supported similar positions on matters 
related to these issues, each of which was central to the containment 
strategy which came to define American foreign policy after World War 
II. Majority support, certainly not division, is a necessary albeit perhaps 
insufficient condition of consensus. 2 
I. See Ole R. Holsti and James N. Rosenau, American Leadership in World Affairs 
(Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1984), and "The Structure of Foreign Policy Attitudes Among 
American Leaders," Journal of Politics, 51(February1990): 94-125; Eugene R. Wittkopf, 
"On the Foreign Policy Beliefs of the American People: A Critique and Some Evidence," 
International Studies Quarterly, 30 (December 1986): 425-45, "Elites and Masses: Another 
Look at Attitudes Toward America's World Role," International Studies Quarterly, 31 
(June 1987): 131-59, and Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign 
Policy (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990). 
2. Despite the ubiquitous use of "consensus" as a portrayal of the domestic political en-
vironment in the postwar era, no consensus about its meaning exists. Holsti's depiction of 
the convergence of leadership opinion around a set of propositions that resulted in "a 
politically effective centrist coalition that supported the main contours of a globalist 
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In the analysis that follows, we probe the historical record on these 
core issues to determine whether public opinion on foreign policy ques-
tions satisfies the necessary condition for a consensus. The period prior 
to U.S. disengagement from Vietnam is our primary concern, but some 
evidence from the mid-1970s onward has also been examined and is 
reported where appropriate. In this way, the temporal variations in 
public attitudes about American foreign policy in the decades following 
World War II can be examined in order to assess the character of the pre-
and post-Vietnam eras. 3 The empirical base consists of the marginal fre-
quencies on over 500 public opinion questions on these core issues asked 
by leading polling organizations during the past four decades. Space 
precludes reporting all of these frequencies, but a representative number 
of those especially germane to the analyses are included. 4 Inevitably, dif-
ferences in question wording, in the meaning of similar words and 
phrases used in polls over such long stretches of time, and in survey 
design and measurement, require that the available information be ap-
proached with caution. Still, a probe of the historical record is in order as 
the continuing and perhaps growing importance of domestic politics to 
an understanding of the role of the United States in world affairs de-
mand a better understanding of the historical record than now exists. 
foreign policy" describes the nature of the consensus in terms applicable to its use by others 
and in other settings. Ole R. Holsti, "The Three-Headed Eagle: The United States and 
System Change," International Studies Quarterly, 23 (September 1979): 342. Other discus-
sions of the concept can be found in Gabriel A. Almond, The American People and 
Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1960); Richard J. Barnet, "Reflections: The Four 
Pillars," The New Yorker, 9 March 1987, pp. 76-84, 87-89; James Chace, "ls a Foreign 
Policy Consensus Possible?" Foreign Affairs (Fall 1978): 1-16; I. M. Destler, Leslie H. 
Gelb, and Anthony Lake, Our Own Worst Enemy: The Unmaking of American Foreign 
Policy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984); Richard Falk, "Lifting the Curse of Bi-
partisanship," World Policy Journal, 1 (Fall 1983): 127-57; and Ralph B. Levering, The 
Public and American Foreign Policy, 1918-1978 (New York: William Morrow and Com-
pany, 1978). 
3. Bipartisanship in congressional-executive relations is another element of the presumed 
foreign policy consensus which we have examined, in James M. McCormick and Eugene R. 
Wittkopf, "Bush and Bipartisanship: The Past as Prologue?," Washington Quarterly, 13 
(Winter 1990): 5-16. 
4. The complete set of items on which the analyses are based is available from the 
authors on request. In addition to the three core issues described above, the opinion items 
that are the focus of our attention are those repeated more than once in public opinion 
surveys in the postwar period or whose wording and/or substantive content was sufficiently 
close to the repeated items to warrant inclusion in the data set. Thus the empirical base on 
which the analyses rest may not exhaust all items relevant to the three core issues, but it is 
believed to include all of those that were asked more than once. The emphasis on repeated 
items is intended to minimize the impact that question wording may have on the survey 
responses. 
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I. The Threat of Communism 
Fear of communism is intimately related to the anticommunist and anti-
Soviet thrust of postwar American foreign policy, as well as to the asso-
ciated foreign policy strategy of containment, yet the meaning of the 
phrase, "threat of communism," is itself ambiguous in the public mind. 
For some, it might be understood primarily in terms of a threat from 
within, as during the McCarthy period in the early 1950s. In that instance 
the broad anticommunist consensus at the general philosophical level in 
the United States actually permitted McCarthyism to thrive. 5 Evidence 
from Gallup polls in the late 1940s and early 1950s showed that, of the 
most important problems facing the nation, the threat of communism at 
home was often uppermost in the thinking of many Americans. 
More often, however, the threat of communism is conceived as exter-
nal in nature and frequently linked to the behavior of the Soviet Union. 
In 1951, a vast majority of the respondents in a National Opinion 
Research Center (NORC) survey explained the importance they attached 
to stopping the spread of communism: "Communism is a real threat to 
U.S. security and to our free way of life. Only a few based their position 
on philosophical or ideological grounds." 6 Nearly four decades later, in 
March 1986, a poll sponsored by the National Strategy Information 
Center found that 85 percent of the respondents tended to be ''suspicious 
of the Soviet Union,'' and more than half of these attributed their beliefs 
to the Soviets' "aggressive international behavior." "Communist 
ideology" was a distant second choice. For most Americans, then, we 
may assume that the communist threat is more than simply the threat of 
alien ideas and that "containing communism" means primarily contain-
ing an external politico-military threat. Although anticommunism and 
anti-Sovietism do not necessarily go hand-in-hand, it appears that, for 
most Americans, "containing communism" refers to an external security 
threat, not an ideological or internal subversive one. 
Attitudes Toward the Containment of Communism 
and the Threat from Abroad 
How important is containing communism? In 1974, the Chicago Council 
on Foreign Relations initiated a series of quadrennial foreign policy 
5. See William Bragg Ewald, Jr., McCarthyism and Consensus? (Lanham, MD: Univer-
sity Press of America, 1986). 
6. U.S. Department of State, Popular Attitudes toward the World Communist Threat, 
August 29, 1951 (Washington, DC: Division of Public Studies, Office of Public Affairs, 
1951), p. I. 
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surveys. 1 Each posed a series of foreign policy goals the United States 
might have and asked respondents to indicate how important they 
regarded each of them. One goal was "containing communism." In the 
1974 survey, 54 percent of the respondents thought containing commu-
nism was a very important goal, 26 percent regarded it as somewhat im-
portant, and 13 percent saw it as not at all important (7 percent were not 
sure). Three subsequent Chicago Council surveys produced much the 
same results, with only slight variations in the percentages. 
How do these response patterns compare with the historical record? 
Interestingly, NORC asked an analogous question in three surveys in the 
early 1950s (in January and April 1950, and in June 1951): "In general, 
how important do you think it is for the United States to try to stop the 
spread of Communism?'' In all three cases the overwhelming proportion 
of the American people believed the goal to be ''very important,'' and 
almost none believed it unimportant. It appears, then, that containing 
communism is an enduring theme in public perceptions of postwar 
American foreign policy. Whether anticommunism and containment re-
main as salient is, however, another matter to which we will return. 
The Chicago Council also gathered evidence from the post-Vietnam 
period about Americans' perceptions of the threat of communism, 
shown in Table I. It suggests considerable variability in the salience the 
mass public attaches to the countries and regions where communist 
forces might come to power insofar as such developments would be a 
threat to the United States. Communism in Japan or in Europe or Latin 
America is clearly seen as threatening, but even in these cases there is 
considerable variation in the apparent importance Americans attach to 
different countries. A clear majority, for example, perceives communism 
in Mexico as a "great threat" to the United States, but there is a measur-
able difference between the salience attached to the threat of communism 
in Mexico as compared with El Salvador. Similarly, there is wide varia-
tion in how threatening the American people think a communist Italy or 
France would be, even though both are Western European allies of the 
United States. While there are no countries or regions in which the ma-
jority of the American people regard the rise of communism to be no 
threat or not much of a threat to the United States, it is clear that policy-
7. John E. Rielly, ed., American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1975 (Chicago: 
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1975); American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign 
Policy 1979 (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1979); American Public 
Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1983 (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 
1983); and American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1987 (Chicago: Chicago 
Council on Foreign Relations, 1987). 
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Table I. Attitudes Toward the Threat of Communism, 1974-1986 
NOT SURE/ 
DATE THREAT NO THREAT ASCERTAINED 
OJo OJo OJo 
Western Europe 12174 71 19 10 
Latin American countries 12/74 69 20 10 
Japan 12174 68 23 11 
African countries 12174 51 35 14 
Italy 12174 50 37 14 
Portugal 12174 47 39 14 
If ... were to become communist, do you think this would be a threat to the United States, 
or not? 
NOT NO 
GREAT SOMEWHAT VERY THREAT DON'T 
DATE WORDING THREAT A THREAT MUCH AT ALL KNOW 
OJo OJo OJo OJo OJo 
Mexico 11178 A 53 26 9 5 7 
11/82 B 61 19 8 4 9 
11/86 B 62 18 10 5 5 
Iran 11178 A 35 35 II 6 13 
11/82 B 24 35 22 10 10 
France 11/78 A 26 41 17 7 10 
11/82 B 31 38 17 6 9 
11/86 B 30 38 18 8 6 
Italy 11178 A 18 40 24 9 9 
Chile 11178 A 17 35 24 9 15 
Saudi Arabia 11/82 B 49 31 8 3 9 
11/86 B 39 35 12 5 8 
El Salvador 11/82 B 21 43 21 6 10 
11/86 B 27 43 17 4 8 
Taiwan 11/82 B 17 37 23 11 13 
The Philippines 11/86 B 37 35 15 6 7 
South Africa 11/86 B 21 40 22 9 9 
A. I am going to read a list of countries. For each, tell me how much of a threat it would be 
to the U.S. if the Communists came to power in that country through peaceful elec-
tions. First, what if the Communist Party came to power through peaceful elections in 
. . . . Do you think this would be a great threat to the U.S., somewhat of a threat to the 
U.S., not very much of a threat to the U.S.,or no threat at all to the U.S.? 
B. I am going to read a list of countries. For each, tell me how much of a threat it would be 
to the U.S. if the Communists came to power. First, what if the Communist Party came 
to power in .... Do you think this would be a great threat to the U.S., somewhat of a 
threat to the U.S., not very much of a threat to the U.S., or no threat at all to the U.S.? 
Note: 1974 survey conducted by Louis Harris & Associates, 1978-1986 by the Gallup Poll. 
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Table II. Attitudes Toward the Threat of Communism, 1948 
DATE WORDING YES NO DON'T KNOW 
OJo OJo OJo 
Western Europe 7/48 A 80 10 10 
Germany 7/48 B 80 9 11 
China 7/48 c 73 14 13 
South America 7/48 D 70 15 15 
China 11/48 E 71 17 12 
Mexico 11/48 F 82 8 10 
South America 11/48 G 80 8 12 
A. Do you think it makes much difference to the United States whether the countries in 
Western Europe go Communist or not? 
B. Do you think it makes much difference to the United States whether Germany goes 
Communist or not? 
C. How about China? [Do you think it makes much difference to the United States 
whether China goes Communist or not?] 
D. And how about the small countries in South America? [Do you think it makes much dif-
ference to the United States whether they go Communist or not?] 
E. Do you think it makes much difference to our country whether China goes communist 
or not? 
F. How about Mexico-Do you think it would make much difference to our country 
whether or not Mexico were to go Communist? 
G. And how about the countries in South America? [Do you think it makes much dif-
ference to our country whether they go Communist or not?] 
Source: National Opinion Research Center (NORC). 
makers would face varying degrees of difficulty in selling an anticommu-
nist program to the public depending on how and where the threat 
occurred. 
This conclusion does not seem to apply to the limited comparable 
historical evidence, shown in Table II, which goes back to the late 1940s. 
From these data, it would appear that policymakers would have enjoyed 
broad support for pursuing an anticommunist strategy virtually any-
where. On closer inspection, however, it is not entirely clear that the 
1940s differ all that much from the 1970s and 1980s. In each year be-
tween 1978 and 1986, for example, roughly four-fifths of the American 
people regarded the possibility of communism in Mexico as either some-
what or a great threat to the United States. In 1948, 82 percent thought 
"it would make a difference to our country [if] ... Mexico were to go 
Communist." Other comparisons of the data in Tables I and II raise as 
many questions as they answer. Would the American people have 
This content downloaded from 129.186.176.219 on Mon, 16 Mar 2020 18:49:22 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
634 The Cold War Consensus 
attached any greater salience to the threat of communism in South Africa 
in 1948 than they did in the 1980s? Or in Saudi Arabia? Or Chile, or El 
Salvador, or Italy, or Iran? 
Combating Communism 
Although the foregoing suggests continuity in public attitudes toward 
containment and the perceived threat of communism in other countries, 
there is considerable evidence that challenges the proposition that anti-
communism is as salient in the post-Vietnam era as it was in the period 
between the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine in 1947 and Congress's 
approval of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution in 1964. Eleven possible foreign 
policy goals were specified in all four of the Chicago Council surveys. If 
we look at the rank order of these goals to determine the relative, as op-
posed to absolute, salience Americans attach to different foreign policy 
objectives, we find that "containing communism" ranks either fourth or 
fifth in terms of the proportion of the respondents who regarded the goal 
as ''very important,'' consistently placing behind protecting the jobs of 
American workers, securing adequate supplies of energy, and worldwide 
arms control. It is also interesting to note that "protecting weaker na-
tions from foreign aggression," arguably a major tenet of postwar 
American foreign policy interventionism, comes in tenth among the 
eleven goals in all four of the surveys. More recently, a March 1988 
survey by the Americans Talk Security (ATS) project found that "com-
bating international drug traffic" was deemed to be the most important 
national security goal by a plurality of Americans (22 percent). "Keeping 
communist governments out of Central and South America" and "con-
taining Soviet aggression around the world" followed in fourth (13 per-
cent) and fifth place (12 percent), respectively. 
Contrast these findings with responses to the question asked by NORC 
in 1951 and again in 1952: "If you had to choose, which would you say is 
more important-to keep Communism from spreading, or to stay out of 
another war?" Roughly two-thirds chose "keep Communism from 
spreading"; less than 30 percent chose "stay out of another war." 
Similarly, in five surveys between September 1950 and June 1952, NORC 
asked: "If Communist armies attack any other countries in the world, do 
you think the United States should stay out of it, or should we help de-
fend these countries, like we did in Korea.'' While the responses reflected 
growing disillusionment with the Korean War in which the United States 
was then mired, "help defend" others consistently out-polled "stay 
out"-by a 66 to 14 percent margin at its peak in September 1950 and by 
a 45 to 33 percent margin at its low point in June 1952. Furthermore, if 
those responding "it depends" (presumably on the circumstances or 
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countries involved) are added to those opting to help others, a majority 
of Americans always chose involvement over noninvolvement. 
At another level relating the ends and means of American foreign 
policy, consider responses to a series of questions asked by Gallup and 
NORC between 1955 and 1957, which asked respondents whether they 
approved the use of economic assistance for purposes of supporting 
countries willing "to stand with us" in opposing communist aggression. 
Although some variations in wording exist on this item, the average level 
of support across eight NORC surveys between January 1955 and 
January 1956 was 81 percent. Contrast this with the support, which aver-
aged only 46 percent, for the following proposition posed in 1956 and 
1957: ''We have also sent economic aid to some countries like India, 
which have not joined us as allies against the Communists. Do you think 
we should continue to send economic aid to these countries, or not?" 
Comparable data linking foreign aid to anticommunism are not available 
in the post-Vietnam period, but public support since the 1950s has gener-
ally fallen far short of these levels. 8 
Military aid grounded at one time in the Mutual Security Act has also 
figured prominently as an anticommunist instrument in American 
foreign policy and, like economic assistance, has historically enjoyed 
considerable, if not always overwhelming, popular support when cast in 
an anticommunist framework. In 1948 and 1949, for example, NORC 
asked respondents in several polls if they approved or disapproved of 
sending military supplies to help the Chinese government in its battle 
with ''the Chinese communists.'' Only about one-third responded favor-
ably in February 1948, but support was higher thereafter and reached 55 
percent in an April 1948 survey. More striking are responses to the ques-
tion "Do you think the United States should send military supplies to 
help those governments in Asia that are threatened by Communism?" In 
six surveys taken in 1950 and 1951, the proportion of favorable responses 
averaged 57 percent and never fell below 50 percent. A similar question 
asked in 1952 elicited a 54 percent approval rating, and in July 1950, a 
month after the North Koreans invaded South Korea, nearly two-thirds 
of the American people were willing ''to help those governments in Asia 
[other than Korea] that are threatened by Communism." 
Aid to Western Europe, the focal point of American foreign policy in 
the immediate postwar years and throughout the 1950s, combined the 
use of military and economic assistance to combat communism. 
8. Cf. Christine E. Contee, What Americans Think: Views on Development and 
U.S.-Third World Relations (Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council, 1987), p. 
23. 
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Although public opinion surveys conducted during this period did not tie 
questions about support for economic and military aid to its anticommu-
nist roots directly, there is little doubt that the rhetoric of the period did 
so. 9 Interestingly, both the Marshall Plan and sending military supplies 
to Europe enjoyed considerable popular approval. Even before the Mar-
shall Plan was publicly unveiled, between 70 and 80 percent of the 
American people approved "sending machinery and other supplies to 
help the countries of western Europe get their factories and farms run-
ning again." Once the plan was in place, support in 1949-1950 for "con-
tinuing to send economic aid to western Europe'' rarely dropped below 
60 percent and frequently ran higher. Similar levels of support were 
registered for supplying Western Europe militarily. Noteworthy is that 
the proportion of favorable responses grew from less than a majority in 
much of 1949 to over 60 percent a year later, and it remained at that level 
throughout the rest of the decade. 
II. The Use of Force 
The Vietnam syndrome reflects the anti-interventionist dispositions of 
the American people that surfaced in the 1960s and 1970s in the wake of 
the Southeast Asian war. Trends in attitudes toward the war itself are il-
lustrated by responses to the Gallup question: "In view of developments 
since we entered the fighting in Vietnam, do you think the U.S. made a 
mistake sending troops to fight in Vietnam?" In early 1966, only about a 
quarter of the American people responded affirmatively, but the propor-
tion grew steadily thereafter, crossing the 50 percent threshold in August 
1968 and the 60 percent mark in May 1971. Growing antagonism to the 
war generally, especially apparent from late 1968 onward, reflects a 
growing bipartisan conviction that the war was a mistake. Democrats 
had consistently supported the war in greater numbers than Republicans, 
at least while Lyndon Johnson was in office, but once Richard Nixon 
became President, party differences largely disappeared. 10 The lasting 
impact of these views is suggested in responses to a series of questions 
asked by the Harris and Gallup organizations about the "morality" of 
the Vietnam war. The evidence indicates that sometime during 1971 an 
9. See Gilbert R. Winham, "Developing Theories of Foreign Policy-Making: A Case 
Study of Foreign Aid," Journal of Politics, 32 (February 1970): 41-70. 
10. We do not mean to suggest that the reasons for the growing opposition to the war 
were always the same, for there is evidence they were not. See Godfrey Hodgson, In Our 
Time: America from World War II to Nixon (London: Macmillan, 1977); and Milton J. 
Rosenberg, Sidney Verba, and Philip E. Converse, Vietnam and the Silent Majority (New 
York: Harper, 1970). 
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Table III. Circumstances that Might Justify the United States 
Going to War in the Future, 1969-1971 
DATE WORTH NOT WORTH NOT SURE 
% 0,10 0,10 
Western Europe were invaded by the 10/69 50 34 16 
Communists 8/70 45 35 20 
7/71 47 31 22 
The Communists invaded Australia 10/69 49 35 16 
8170 40 40 20 
7/71 40 38 22 
The Russians took over West Berlin 10/69 37 46 17 
7171 32 47 21 
The Russians tried to take over West 8170 39 42 20 
Berlin 
Castro took over a country in South 10/69 35 50 15 
America 8170 34 47 19 
7171 31 50 19 
Communist China invaded Formosa 10/69 25 57 19 
7/71 18 58 24 
Israel were losing the war [1970: 10/69 16 67 18 
a war] with the Arabs 8170 19 57 24 
The Russians occupied Yugoslavia 10/69 12 70 18 
7171 ll 66 23 
There has been a lot of discussion about what circumstances might justify the United States 
going to war again in the future. Do you feel if ... it would be worth going to war again, or 
not? 
Source: Louis Harris & Associates. 
overwhelming proportion of the American people became convinced that 
the Vietnam war was fundamentally misguided. That viewpoint has per-
sisted ever since. 
Alternative Scenarios 
The impact of Americans' beliefs about the Vietnam war on their dispo-
sition to use American troops in potential conflict situations elsewhere is 
suggested by the data in Table III, which reports responses to questions 
asked by the Harris organization between October 1969 and July 1971 
about "what circumstances might justify the United States going to war 
again in the future." Only those situations that were probed more than 
once are recorded. The results are unambiguous: with the single excep-
tion of the hypothetical situation in which Israel was losing in a war to 
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the Arabs, all of the proposed scenarios for America going to war again 
show a decline in support by the American people. Moreover, in a major-
ity of these, the balance between the "worth" and "not worth" re-
sponses tipped in the latter direction. 
The data in Table III, while somewhat ambiguous, generally register 
an erosion of support during the short period between 1969 and 1971 for 
the interventionist thrust characteristic of postwar American foreign 
policy. More difficult to answer is whether strong public support for in-
terventionism and war ever existed. The survey data from the early 1950s 
indicating a preference for stopping communism rather than averting 
war, summarized above, support an affirmative conclusion. Other 
historical data also suggest the answer may be "yes." 
In 1950 Gallup asked, "Do you think the United States should or 
should not go to war with Russia if any of these things happen?" The 
scenarios were attacks by communist troops on the Philippines, the 
American zone in Germany, and Formosa. Whereas the 50 percent 
response rate in support of going to war "if Western Europe were in-
vaded by the Communists" is the highest recorded in Table Ill, 80 per-
cent of the respondents in the 1950 survey were willing to go to war over 
Germany, and an even larger number, 82 percent, was willing to go to 
war over the Philippines. Less support was evident in the case of For-
mosa, but even there nearly three-fifths responded the U.S. should go to 
war in its defense. Recognizing that question wording as well as the con-
text of the times may affect the responses, the contrast with public atti-
tudes two decades later is nonetheless striking. 
In the early 1960s Gallup, Harris, and Roper also began to ask about 
the willingness of the American people to defend West Berlin against 
Soviet encroachment. Once more the pattern is clear: strong majority 
support (averaging 67 percent) during the 1960s, is followed by a marked 
decline (to an average of 40 percent) in the 1970s. 
Other situations are less easily characterized. In the case of Western 
Europe, only 50 percent of the respondents in a 1970 Harris poll in-
dicated a willingness to use American troops to oppose a communist 
takeover, and the proportion so disposed in analogous questions asked 
thereafter ranged from only 40 percent in 1974 to 68 percent in 1986. En-
tirely comparable questions in the historical record do not exist, but, in-
terestingly, these figures are not dramatically different from responses to 
two NORC polls taken in 1947 and 1949 in which only 52 and 55 percent 
of the respondents approved the use of armed forces to stop an attack by 
Russia on "some small European country" or by "some big country" on 
"a western European nation." Other data from this period indicate 
strong support for the North Atlantic alliance. In 1949, over three-
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quarters of the American people supported Senate approval of the 
NATO treaty, and support for the alliance grew thereafter, with some 87 
percent of the respondents in a 1955 NORC survey viewing favorably the 
mutual commitment of the U.S. and Western Europe "to defend each 
other against attack." 
In the case of U.S. mutual defense commitments in Asia, 58 percent of 
the respondents in a June 1954 NORC survey approved the idea of the 
United States signing a defense agreement with "the Philippines, Siam, 
and Australia,'' and in November of that year over three-quarters ap-
proved the just-signed Southeast Asia treaty that created the Southeast 
Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). However, when asked whether it 
was more important for the United States "to keep the Communists 
from taking over Asia, or to keep the Communists from taking over 
Europe," Europe won out by margins of 32 to 16 and 31to12 percent in 
two 1951 surveys and by a margin of 43 to 15 percent in 1953, with be-
tween 30 and 40 percent of those sampled attaching equal importance to 
both regions. 
Outside of Western Europe and the SEATO framework, Yugoslavia 
has often been the focus of pollsters' attention. In 1951, NORC asked: 
"If Communist armies were to attack Yugoslavia, do you think the United 
States should stay out of it, or should we help defend them?" Forty-two 
percent of the respondents favored helping the Yugoslavs. A similar 
question asked by Harris in 1969 found only 27 percent willing to help 
Yugoslavia. Even less support (11-18 percent) was registered in three 
polls taken in 1974 and 1978 in which the use of troops to defend 
Yugoslavia was the focus of attention. In two 1980 polls, however, an 
average of 34 percent of the respondents favored the use of U.S. troops if 
Soviet troops invaded Yugoslavia. The trends thus generally mirror atti-
tudes toward the defense of West Berlin, but at a generally lower level of 
support throughout. 11 
These findings have a parallel in the case of Iran, in which the United 
States has had long-standing interests and a history of close involvement. 
Twice in 1951 a national cross-section was asked: "If Communist armies 
were to attack Iran (Persia), do you think the United States should stay 
out of it, or should we help defend them?" Between 47 and 48 percent of 
the respondents preferred to help defend Iran. Sending troops in addi-
tion to military supplies was also preferred by a majority of those willing 
to defend Iran which, extrapolated across the entire sample, translates 
11. Cf. John E. Mueller, "Changes in American Public Attitudes Toward International 
Involvement," in The Limits of Intervention, ed. Ellen P. Stern (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage 
Publications, 1977), p. 332. 
This content downloaded from 129.186.176.219 on Mon, 16 Mar 2020 18:49:22 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
640 The Cold War Consensus 
into about a quarter of the American people willing to use American 
troops to defend Iran against a Communist attack. Contrast these find-
ings with the results of an early 1973 Harris poll: 57 percent of the 
respondents opposed U.S. military involvement, including the use of 
troops, in the event "there were a danger of a communist takeover of 
Iran.'' Only 23 percent supported the idea. Although this proportion 
compares favorably with those willing to use troops in Iran's defense in 
the early 1950s, the clear majority opposed to military involvement does 
not. Less clear perhaps is the meaning that should be ascribed to these 
results given the widely discrepant circumstances to which they apply. 
Two other non-European countries that have figured prominently in 
postwar American foreign policy, and to which the United States has 
been tied in mutual defense treaties, are South Korea and Nationalist 
China (Taiwan). In the case of Korea, of course, the United States did 
commit troops to its defense, and, as the data summarized above indi-
cate, in July 1950, a month after the U.S. became involved in the Korean 
conflict, a clear majority of the American people were willing to go to 
war over the defense of Formosa, which at the time must surely have 
seemed a likely possibility. Somewhat less enthusiasm was expressed later 
in response to a 1956 item which asked: "If the Chinese Communists at-
tack Formosa, do you think the United States should help defend For-
mosa, even if other countries do not join with us?'' Still, over half of the 
respondents responded affirmatively, and only a third negatively. Since 
the 1950s, however, the American people have been decidedly unwilling 
to support the use of troops to defend either South Korea or Taiwan. In 
1969, for example, 48 percent of the respondents in a Harris poll were 
willing to support the use of U.S. troops in the event there "were a 
danger of a Communist takeover of South Korea,'' and 38 percent were 
similarly disposed in the case of Taiwan (Formosa). By 1974, however, 
the proportions had dropped to 15 and 17 percent, respectively, and the 
support level has hovered around 20 percent ever since. 
Various nations in the Western hemisphere have from time to time 
figured prominently in postwar American foreign policy. The available 
opinion data suggest some rather dramatic shifts in attitudes toward the 
use of troops. At several points between 1947 and 1965, as Table IV 
shows, Americans indicated a willingness to come to the defense of their 
southern neighbors. In 1965, for example, NORC asked: "Suppose there 
is a revolution in one of the countries of South America, and it looks as 
though a Communist government will take over. Do you think the 
United States should or should not send in American troops to prevent 
this?" Nearly three-quarters said the U.S. should. But when confronted 
with a situation in El Salvador in the early 1980s that arguably fit the 
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Table IV. Attitudes Toward the Use of Troops in Central and 
South America, 1947-1983 
DON'T KNOW/ 
FAVORABLE NOT QUALIFIED/ 
DATE WORDING RESPONSE FAVORABLE NO OPINION 
OJo OJo OJo 
6/47 A 72 12 16 
4149 B 62 19 19 
9149 c 50 30 20 
6154 D 65 26 9 
6165 E 73 19 8 
3/82 F 18 79 4 
5/83 F 14 80 6 
A. Suppose some country attacked one of the countries in South America. Would you 
approve or disapprove of the United States sending armed forces along with other 
American countries to stop the attack? (NORC) 
B. Suppose some big country attacks a South American nation. Would you approve or dis-
approve of the United States using its armed forces to help stop the attack? (NORC) 
C. How about South America-Would you approve or disapprove of the United States 
using its armed forces to help stop any attack on a country in South America? (NORC) 
D. Suppose some country in South or Central America does set up a Communist govern-
ment. Would you favor trying to get them out, even if we have to use armed force? 
(NORC) 
E. Suppose there is a revolution in one of the countries of South America, and it looks as 
though a Communist government will take over. Do you think the United States should 
or should not send in American troops to prevent this? (NORC) 
F. And would you approve or disapprove of the United States sending troops to fight in El 
Salvador? [Followed "If the El Salvadoran government cannot defeat the rebels, do 
you think the United States will eventually send American soldiers to fight in El 
Salvador or not?"] (ABC News) 
scenario posed a decade and a half earlier, less than a fifth of the Ameri-
can people were willing to send in American boys. Notably, however, the 
question did not include any reference to communism. 
Israel is a particularly interesting case because the United States has 
been tied so closely to it. Surprisingly, the willingness of the American 
people to defend Israel militarily has been rather low and, indeed, has 
not differed markedly from the Korean and Chinese cases. In 1969, 44 
percent of the American people responded affirmatively when asked: 
''Suppose war breaks out again between Israel and the Arab countries. 
What if it looked as though Israel would be overrun by the Arabs with 
Russian help, do you think the U.S. should help Israel or stay out?" A 
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Table V. Attitudes Toward Eastern Europe and Cuba, 1951-1963 
DON'T KNOW/ 
FAVORABLE NOT NOT SURE/ 
DATE WORDING RESPONSE FAVORABLE NO OPINION 
% % % 
6/53 A 30 58 12 
6155 A 40 52 8 
11/55 A 35 55 IO 
6/61 B 24 65 11 
9162 B 24 63 13 
2/63 B 20 64 16 
11/63 c 32 44 24 
A. As you probably know, a number of countries of Eastern Europe, like Poland and 
Czechoslovakia, have been under Russian control in the last few years. Do you think 
our government should do anything at the present time to try to free these countries 
from Communist rule? (NORC) 
B. Some people say that the United States should send our armed forces into Cuba to help 
overthrow Castro. Do you agree or disagree? (Gallup) 
C. If the Russians do not remove their troops from Cuba, do you think we should invade 
Cuba with American troops or not? (Harris) 
year later, however, in response to a similar question, only 27 percent 
supported the use of U.S. troops. Since that early 1970 poll, the propor-
tion of Americans willing to use troops to defend Israel, as measured by 
ten surveys taken between late 1970 and late 1986, has ranged from only 
17 to 39 percent. 
Aid versus Troops 
Historically, Americans have been especially reluctant to support "roll-
ing back" the Iron Curtain. As shown in Table V, which reports items 
drawn from the period 1953-1963, neither in Eastern Europe nor in 
Cuba has a majority of the American people supported efforts to topple 
Soviet-supported regimes. Little had changed by the 1980s. In late 1980 
(Carter administration) and again in early 1981 (Reagan administration), 
Harris asked what the U.S. should do in the event of a Russian invasion 
of Poland designed to quiet worker unrest there. The "diplomatic op-
tion," as Table VI reports, was the overwhelming favorite, with support 
for economic sanctions close behind. Unambiguously the most un-
popular tactics were "threatening to go to war with Russia if they don't 
get out of Poland" and "going to war to liberate Poland from Russian 
Communist control.'' 
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Table VI. Attitudes Toward a Soviet Invasion of Poland, 1980-1981 
Getting the United Nations General 
Assembly to condemn Russian aggression 
The U.S. and its allies in Western Europe 
ending all trade with the Soviet Union 
The U.S. and its allies sending in money 
and military supplies to help the Polish 
workers and militia to resist the Russian 
invasion 
The U.S. refusing to discuss any further 
arms control agreements with the Russians 
The U.S. staying out of a conflict that is 
between two Communist countries 
The United States withdrawing its 
ambassador from Moscow and breaking 
diplomatic relations with the Russians 
The U.S. threatening to go to war with 
Russia if they don't get out of Poland 
The U.S. going to war to liberate Poland 
























































1980: The Russians have 750,000 troops near the Polish border. It is possible that they will 
go into Poland to repress the labor unrest, as they went into Czechoslovakia in 1968. 
The U.S. and Western European leaders have warned Russia not to invade Poland. 
There is a well-trained Polish army and air force of 350,000 that might resist a Soviet 
invasion. If Russia sends troops into Poland would you favor or oppose ... 
1981: If the Russians invade Poland militarily to put down worker and farmer unrest, 
would you favor or oppose ... 
Source: Louis Harris & Associates. 
Using military aid to cope with the Polish situation ranked high on the 
list of policy options preferred by Americans. In the abstract, however, 
neither military aid nor sales has enjoyed strong support as a policy in-
strument in recent years. Since 1974, respondents have been asked in 
each of the Chicago Council surveys whether they favor or oppose giving 
or selling military equipment to other nations. Only between 23 percent 
(1974) and 33 percent (1986) have favored the former, and between 34 
percent (1978) and 39 percent (1982) the latter. However, when asked in a 
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context where aid becomes a tradeoff for the use of troops, aid is clearly 
the preferred instrument of policy. In 1971 and again in 1975, Gallup 
asked respondents their preferences about how to deal with attacks by 
communist-backed forces against several different nations-send troops, 
send supplies, or refuse to get involved. In few situations was one option 
preferred by a majority over the others (using troops was the majority 
preference in one case and refusing to get involved in four), but aid was 
preferred over the use of troops in 19 of the 24 situations posed. 
More recently, the Americans Talk Security project asked in 1988 
which of four options was the strongest action the United States should 
take in situations where military force might be called for-stay out, use 
diplomatic and political pressure only "against the aggressor nation," 
send military aid "to the country under attack," or "send American 
troops to assist the attacked country.'' The scenarios were the crossing of 
the border into Honduras by Nicaraguan troops to destroy Contra bases, 
a Soviet occupation of Poland following strikes and protests that weaken 
the Polish government, and the invasion of Israel by Arab forces, 
Taiwan by the People's Republic of China, Saudi Arabia by Iran, 
Pakistan by India, and West Berlin by Soviet and East German forces. In 
five of the seven scenarios, "stay out" was the option preferred by a 
plurality. Berlin and Poland were the two exceptions. Among the 
remaining options, diplomatic and political pressures were typically the 
most popular, and in the choice between sending supplies and sending 
troops the latter won out twice by only a single percentage point (18 and 
17 percent in the cases of Saudi Arabia and Israel). 
The data in Table VII suggest an historical counterpart to the tradeoff 
between aid and troops revealed by Gallup in the 1970s and reinforced by 
the ATS findings a decade later. During 1953-1954, as the French were 
fighting to maintain their colonial empire in Indochina, the American 
people were presented with several options regarding the situation. When 
asked in May 1954 if they thought the United States should join with 
others to prevent a communist takeover of Indochina (question wording 
A), an overwhelming majority of 69 percent said "yes." When asked if 
"our own air force should take part in the fighting" (wording B), sup-
port dropped to the 50-60 percent range. When sending air and naval 
forces to help the French (wording C) was posed, support dropped to 
around one-third. And when "sending United States soldiers to take part 
in the fighting" was suggested (wording D), favorable responses ranged 
from less than 10 to less than 25 percent. 
These response patterns arguably reflect the retrospective judgments 
of Americans about the Korean War in much the same way that attitudes 
toward the use of force in the 1970s are hypothesized to have been influ-
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Table VII. Attitudes Toward the Use of U.S. Military Force 
in Indochina, 1953-1954 
NO OPINION/ 
FAVORABLE NOT NOT SURE/ 
DATE WORDING RESPONSE FAVORABLE DON'T KNOW 
OJo OJo o/o 
5/54 A 69 23 8 
5/53 B 55 35 10 
9/53 B 53 34 13 
4/54 B 61 31 8 
5/54 c 36 52 12 
5/54 c 33 55 12 
6/54 c 33 56 12 
8/53 D 8 86 5 
2/54 D 11 82 8 
5/54 D 22 69 9 
5/54 D 20 72 8 
6/54 D 18 72 IO 
A. If other countries are willing to join with us, do you think the United States should or 
should not take part in the fighting, to keep the Communists from taking over all of 
Indo-China? (NORC) 
B. If it looks like the Communists might take over all of Indo-China, do you think our own 
air force should take part in the fighting? (NORC) 
C. Would you approve or disapprove of our sending air and naval forces, but not ground 
forces, to help the French? (Gallup) 
D. The United States is now sending war materials to help the French fight the Communists 
in Indochina. Would you approve or disapprove of sending United States soldiers to 
take part in the fighting there? (Gallup) 
enced by the Vietnam experience. 12 Table VIII records responses to 
Gallup and NORC questions about whether "the United States made a 
mistake in going into the war in Korea'' and whether the war was ''worth 
fighting." The data illustrate growing dissatisfaction with the war while 
it was being fought (1950-1953), but less clear-cut feelings after the war 
than in the case of Vietnam. Nonetheless, the rough similarity in the atti-
tudinal responses of the American people to their two experiences in 
limited war deserves attention, for it cautions against accepting too 
12. In fact, it has been shown that trends in attitudes during the two wars follow similar 
patterns, with declining support for the wars closely correlated with the casualties suffered 
in each. John E. Mueller, "Trends in Popular Support for the Wars in Korea and 
Vietnam," American Political Science Review, 65 (June 1971): 358-75. 
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Table VIII. Attitudes Toward the Korean War, 1950-1956 
NOT WORTH WORTH 
FIGHTING/ FIGHTING/ NO OPINION/ 
DATE WORDING MISTAKE NO MISTAKE DON'T KNOW 
Ofo Ofo Ofo 
8/50 A 20 65 15 
1/51 A 49 38 13 
3/51 B 50 39 11 
3/52 B 51 35 14 
11152 B 43 37 20 
10/52 c 56 32 12 
11/52 c 58 34 8 
12/52 c 52 39 9 
4/53 c 55 36 9 
6/53 c 58 32 10 
8/53 c 62 27 10 
11/53 D 50 38 12 
11/54 D 51 39 10 
9156 D 41 46 13 
A. In view of developments since we entered the fighting in Korea, do you think the United 
States made a mistake in deciding to defend Korea, or not? (Gallup) 
B. Do you think the United States made a mistake in going into the war in Korea, or not? 
(Gallup) 
C. As things stand now, do you feel that the war in Korea has been worth fighting, or not? 
(NORC) 
D. As things stand now, do you feel that the war in Korea was worth fighting, or not? 
(NORC) 
readily that the response to Vietnam uniquely shaped American attitudes 
toward the appropriate role of the U.S. in world affairs. 
In summary, then, there is much evidence to suggest that the American 
people were more willing to support the use of force abroad prior to the 
Vietnam War than during and after it, but this is not unambiguously the 
case. Nor is it unambiguous that Vietnam had a distinctive and unique 
impact on public attitudes toward the use of force. 
III. Relations with the Soviet Union 
Detente as a phase in the Soviet-American relationship is typically asso-
ciated with 1970s, but the question of how to deal with the Soviet Union, 
and in particular how to avoid military conflict with it, has dominated 
American foreign policy for more than a generation. Arms control issues 
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figure prominently on the Soviet-American agenda, and for many years 
the American people have supported efforts to utilize arms control to 
dampen Soviet-American hostility. In 1968, for example, Harris asked: 
''If you had to choose, would you prefer that our government put greater 
emphasis on building up U.S. military power or in trying to come to arms 
control agreements with the Russians?" Thirty percent of the respon-
dents chose to emphasize United States military power, but more than 
twice that number-61 percent-preferred more emphasis on arms con-
trol agreements. A decade later, when the SALT II treaty was being 
negotiated and then actively debated, the American people once more 
demonstrated their support for arms control. In twelve polls taken by 
NBC News between 1977 and 1981 in which respondents were asked 
whether they favored an agreement (or a new agreement) between the 
U.S. and Russia that would limit nuclear weapons, the level of favorable 
responses never fell below 60 percent and averaged nearly 70 percent. 
Similar levels of support were registered in a series of Harris surveys 
taken between 1975 and 1979 in which SALT was specifically mentioned. 
Despite this long-term and apparently broad-based support for reach-
ing accommodations with the Soviet Union, it appears not always to 
have been the case. Between April 1948 and November 1953, NORC 
posed the following question in ten different surveys: "How do you feel 
about our dealings with Russia-Do you think the United States should 
be more willing to compromise with Russia, or is our present policy 
about right, or should we be even firmer than we are today?" "Be even 
firmer" was typically the choice of about three-fifths of the respondents; 
"compromise" never enjoyed more than 10 percent support. During this 
period strong support was also registered for going to war against Russia 
''with all our power, if any Communist army attacks any other 
country,'' including throughout much of the time support for the use of 
atomic and nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union. Not until the 
mid-1950s did support for the thermonuclear option fall below the 50 
percent mark. 
The one significant arms control proposal during this period, Presi-
dent Eisenhower's "open skies" proposal offered at the 1955 Geneva 
summit, failed to win the approval of a majority of the American people. 
Lack of support for Eisenhower's plan may have been a direct conse-
quence of a lack of confidence that the Soviets would live up to such an 
agreement. When asked in three surveys taken in the summer and fall of 
1955 whether "we could count on Russia to live up to whatever agree-
ments may result" from the Geneva summit, the judgment was "no" by 
an overwhelming margin of 40 to 50 percent. The lack of support for 
Eisenhower's proposal is noteworthy nonetheless, especially so given the 
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understandable tendency of Americans to support presidential foreign 
and national security policy initiatives, however questionable they may 
sometimes seem. 
Apart from the issues of war and arms control, the prospect of increas-
ing trade with the Soviet Union, presumably as a route not simply to 
economic gain but also to positive political payoffs, has a long history. 
Responses to a variety of different public opinion questions are shown in 
Table IX. Recognizing that question wording may account in part for the 
variations shown, the overall picture is clear nonetheless: there is an 
unambiguous step-level increase in support for increased Soviet-Ameri-
Table IX. Attitudes Toward Expanding Soviet-American Trade, 
1953-1986 
FAVORABLE NOT DON'T KNOW/ 
DATE WORDING RESPONSE FAVORABLE NOT SURE 
"lo OJo OJo 
8/53 A 40 48 12 
2/54 A 42 44 14 
6155 B 55 29 16 
6156 c 63 32 5 
6/57 D 50 33 17 
Il/57 D 46 33 21 
1/58 E 57 21 21 
2/59 D 55 27 18 
10/63 D 55 33 12 
8/70 F 75 14 12 
6/71 F 76 14 IO 
2/72 F 75 12 13 
A. Should the United States and Russia work out a business arrangement to buy and sell 
goods to each other? (Gallup) 
B. Should the United States and Russia work out an arrangement to buy and sell goods to 
each other? (Gallup) 
C. Do you approve or disapprove of Americans carrying on trade with Russia, if this trade 
does not include war material? (NORC) 
D. Should the United States and Russia work out a business arrangement to buy and sell 
more goods to each other? (Gallup) 
E. In a recent meeting with the U.S., Bulganin, the Russian Prime Minister, made these 
suggestions. Do you think that the U.S. and its Western allies should or should not 
agree to expand East-West trade? (Gallup) 
F. Do you favor or oppose agreement between the United States and Russia on expanding 
trade between the two countries? (Harris) 
This content downloaded from 129.186.176.219 on Mon, 16 Mar 2020 18:49:22 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Eugene R. Wittkopf & James M. McCormick 649 
can trade between the 1950s and 1960s, on the one hand, and the 1970s 
and 1980s, on the other. 
If the changes recorded in Table IX are indicative of a broad shift in 
public attitudes away from confrontation with the Soviet Union and 
toward cooperation, we might expect the changes to be reflected on other 
issues as well. Regrettably, the trade issue-defined broadly and 
abstractly-is the only one among several that have been the focus of the 
Soviet-American dialogue since the Nixon presidency for which there is 
much historical data. But what is available again raises as many ques-
tions as it answers. 
Consider, for example, the question of selling wheat and other grains 
to the Soviet Union. In 1963 Harris asked whether respondents would 
favor or oppose "selling Russia surplus wheat and other food." Fifty-
four percent said they would favor such a move. Little more than a 
Table IX. (continued) 
FAVORABLE NOT DON'T KNOW/ 
DATE WORDING RESPONSE FAVORABLE NOT SURE 
6/73 G 72 14 14 
11/73 H 72 16 12 
12/74 66 21 14 
12175 H 52 25 23 
3/77 J 67 16 17 
4/78 J 71 17 12 
11/78 Ka 46 39 14 
11/82 H 70 26 4 
11/82 Ka 40 47 13 
11/86 K• 52 37 11 
G. Let me read you some possible areas of agreement that might come out of the Nixon-
Brezhnev talks in Washington this month. For each, tell me if you would favor or 
oppose such an agreement. ... Expanding trade between the two countries. (Harris) 
H. Let me read you some proposals that have been made for possible agreements between 
Russia and the United States. For each, tell me if you would favor or oppose such an 
agreement. ... Expanding [1975: expand] trade between the two countries. (Harris) 
I. For each of these proposals that have been made for possible agreement between the 
United States and the Soviet Union, tell me if you would favor or oppose such an agree-
ment. ... Expanding trade between the United States and the Soviet Union. (Harris) 
J. Would you favor the U.S. and Russia increasing trade with each other? (Harris) 
K. Relations between the Soviet Union and the United States have been the subject of dis-
agreement for some time. Please tell me if you would favor or oppose the following 
types of relationship with the Soviet Union .... Restricting U.S.-Soviet trade. 3 (Gallup) 
•Response categories reversed so "restricting trade" is treated as an unfavorable 
response. 
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decade later, an analogous question (Do you favor or oppose an agree-
ment to "sell wheat to Russia on a long-term basis?") elicited support 
from only 29 to 32 percent of the respondents in the two surveys where it 
was asked. Then again, about another decade later, in the 1986 Chicago 
Council survey, 57 percent of the respondents approved "increasing 
grain sales to the Soviet Union.'' In many respects the trends in these 
data are the exact opposite from what might be expected. The suspicion 
is that domestic politics-particularly adverse reactions to "The Great 
American Grain Robbery" of 1972-soured American attitudes regard-
ing this particular element of detente. 
Automobiles, machinery, machine tools, computers, and advanced 
computers have been mentioned as possible trade items in several differ-
ent surveys between 1948 and 1986. If these are conceived broadly as 
"high technology exports," as each might properly have been regarded 
in its appropriate historical context, then it is clear the American people 
have never supported trade in such goods. In 1963, 51 percent of the 
respondents to a Harris survey supported the idea of "selling Russia U.S. 
automobiles," but this is the only instance in the eight surveys in which 
the foregoing items are mentioned where a majority supported the 
specified relationship. 
On the other hand, space exploration seems to have become accepted 
as a legitimate area of Soviet-American cooperation. In 1963, only about 
a third of the respondents in a Harris survey approved of the idea of 
"sending a man to the moon with the Russians." A decade later it was 
commonplace for two-thirds of the public to support joint Soviet-
American space ventures. Perhaps because the U.S. had "won the race" 
to be the first to place a person on the moon, space was no longer re-
garded as a primary area of Cold War competition. 
Much the same is true in the area of scientific exchanges. Again using 
1963 as the base point, only about a third of the public in that year sup-
ported "exchanging engineers, physicists, and other scientists with 
Russia." In December 1974, 64 percent supported "exchanging scientists 
and other technical missions" with the Soviet Union. 
Most of the data summarized here are consistent with the proposition 
that the American people have been more willing to build bridges of ac-
commodation to the Soviet Union in the post-Vietnam era than they were 
before the war in Southeast Asia. This conclusion is not unambiguous, 
but clearly it makes little sense to talk about joint exploration of space 
with the Soviet Union-as was preferred in the 1970s-in an environ-
ment where using nuclear weapons against Moscow in the event of a 
communist attack elsewhere is widely supported-as it was in the 1950s. 
Neither Vietnam nor other developments of the 1960s and 1970s that 
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contributed to the change in public attitudes toward foreign policy, in-
cluding detente itself, may explain that change-the growing capability 
of the Soviet Union to destroy the United States with nuclear weapons is 
a better bet-but the change in attitude is no less real. 
IV. Summary and Conclusions 
Did a Cold War consensus in American popular opinion ever exist? Was 
it shattered by the Vietnam experience? Generating answers to these im-
portant questions is difficult, and the historical data and analytical ap-
proach used here may be inadequately tailored to the task. Any number 
of different partisan, ideological, educational, and regional configura-
tions might produce the opinion patterns examined here. 13 There are, 
furthermore, other elements of the consensus that might be examined, 
such as attitudes toward the United Nations and other international 
organizations and toward elements of the liberal international economic 
order created after World War II, that may reveal patterns at variance 
with those unearthed here. Nonetheless, our analyses offer important in-
sight into the domestic context of American foreign policy in the decades 
immediately following World War II. Specifically, our probe of the 
historical record suggests a cautious but affirmative response to both of 
the questions posed above: a foreign policy consensus seems to have ex-
isted in American popular opinion prior to Vietnam, but it has since 
eroded. 
Evidence for the existence of a foreign policy consensus and for its ero-
sion in the wake of Vietnam is clearest in the attitudes of the American 
people toward the threat of communism. Throughout the postwar 
period, the American people have regarded the containment of com-
munism as an important goal of American foreign policy, and they con-
tinued to see communism as a threat in the 1980s, just as they did in the 
1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. Still, the need to combat this threatening force 
is less enthusiastically embraced today than it was earlier. A key to 
understanding the changing climate of opinion lies in the choice of 
roughly two-thirds of the American people in the early 1950s to stop the 
spread of communism rather than avert war. Another key is found in the 
13. Unfortunately, the requisite data that would permit a complete examination of the 
propositions from this viewpoint are not readily available-although, it should be added 
quickly, those that are do not contradict the findings summarized above. See Robert Y. 
Shapiro and Benjamin I. Page, "Subgroup Trends in Policy Choices: A Preliminary 
Report on Some Theories and Findings," (Paper presented at the Midwest Political Science 
Association, Chicago, April 11-14, 1984). 
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broad support for the use of economic and military aid for purposes of 
combating communism evident in the 1940s and 1950s. Although ques-
tions worded in the same way since then are not available, the enthusiasm 
for using aid as an anticommunist instrument early in the postwar years 
compared with the general dissatisfaction with aid of any sort in the 
1970s and 1980s cannot be overlooked. 
Whether the Vietnam experience contributed to these changes is not 
easily determined, and the data do not point to any direct causal connec-
tion. But to many people Vietnam symbolized the bankruptcy of military 
solutions to political problems, and in this sense it doubtless contributed 
to growing divisiveness about how best to deal with the communist 
threat. It is also true, however, that the world today is more complex and 
diverse than it was in the 1950s, and this fact, often pointed to by 
analysts concerned with the question of whether (or why) the Cold War 
consensus has broken (did break) down, may likewise account for the ap-
parent lack of clarity on how best to cope with the communist menace. 
As issues that once seemed black and white coalesce into shades of gray, 
devising appropriate responses becomes more problematic. 
The evidence based on mass public attitudes that best supports the 
view that Vietnam was a causal factor as well as watershed in American 
foreign policy is that regarding the use of force. In the immediate post-
Vietnam years the disposition to use force in a broad range of overseas 
conflict situations was severely restricted. Yet there is also evidence that 
as the memory of Vietnam recedes, the willingness of the American peo-
ple to use force has grown once more. But there is a perceptible dif-
ference: public support for the use of force has not regained the same 
level that seems to have existed prior to Vietnam. Majority support-an 
admittedly timid criterion for the existence of consensus-was frequently 
but not always realized before Vietnam but more often failed to be real-
ized once overt American military involvement in Southeast Asia began. 
Evidence relating to cooperation in Soviet-American relations also 
points toward change in the postwar years, but in this case it is difficult 
to relate changes in attitudes to the Vietnam experience in the same way 
that attitudes toward the use of force seem causally related to it. Vietnam 
doubtless influenced mass attitudes toward America's world role, which 
in turn affected Americans' views of the Soviet Union just as it also af-
fected attitudes toward the threat of communism, but the impact is less 
clearly identifiable and hence less dramatic than might have been ex-
pected. 
Even the conclusion that changes in public attitudes toward Soviet-
American relations have occurred is somewhat circumstantial in that it is 
drawn less from what Americans approve than from what they disap-
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prove. Clearly they have registered greater support over time for in-
creased trade with the Soviet Union, but there is no clear indication of 
what particular commodities or items should be exchanged in greater 
quantities. Instead, the important evidence derives from the contrast in 
support for increased trade and greater cooperation in some spheres, 
e.g., space, compared with the willingness of large numbers of 
Americans in the 1940s and 1950s to support a "firmer" policy toward 
the Soviets, including a widespread willingness to go to war with them. 
By the 1970s and thereafter, the general climate of opinion was clearly 
more favorable to accommodations with the Soviets than to confronta-
tions with them. This is not to say that the Soviets may have become 
either more trusted or less feared than earlier-the contrary may in fact 
be the case-but only that "compromise" with the Soviets seems to have 
replaced "firmer" as the preferred approach to them. 
In summary, the public opinion data examined here show some ero-
sion of the foundation on which the Cold War consensus was built, but 
they are less than definitive in showing that the Vietnam experience pro-
duced dramatic shifts in public attitudes. In this sense, one might easily 
conclude that the Cold War foreign policy consensus has eroded but not 
entirely dissipated. The findings thus provide important but inconclusive 
support for both the old conventional wisdom, which leaves little ques-
tion that a foreign policy consensus governed the Cold War years, and 
for the new conventional wisdom, which asserts that the post-Vietnam 
era has been marked by greater levels of partisanship and ideological 
dispute. 
